An Inoffensive Rearmament Read Online Free

the Far East, however, communism had overrun the heartland of Asia. If the Cold War was to be stabilized, the West had to face up to the enemy in that area. The Big Three foreign ministers talked about “total diplomacy” and hinted about demonstrations of power. There was vague speculation about actions to be taken in Japan, where the United States maintained an occupation force of substantial ground, sea, and air power. If a demonstration of power was needed in Asia, Japan was the place to make it.
    It was not clear what the Big Three foreign ministers meant by “total diplomacy.” Seemingly the concept proposed a containment of the Soviet Union on all fronts—economic, political, and military. One facet of the “total diplomacy” strategy seemed to contemplate a policy designed to destroy the prestige and influence of the Russians in the Japanese environment. In retrospect, one can now see that this strategy fashioned three blows that were struck at the Soviets during the later part of May and early June 1950, only weeks before the Korean War. The first of these blows knocked the Russians out of the negotiations on the Japanese peace treaty.
    Exploratory talks on a peace treaty with Japan had been going on for some time. As early as March 19, 1947, General MacArthur, in an interview with the press, indicated that he thought Japan’s sovereignty should be restored “as soon as possible.” At that time, the supreme commander envisioned a special status for Japan, a kind of international protectorate under “mild” controls and guidance from the United Nations. It is significant that General MacArthur, back in 1947, pointed out that “if the UN is ever to succeed, this was the most favorable opportunity it had.” He conceded that it might be advisable to reconsider Japan’s pledge against maintaining “war potential,” suggesting that a small military establishment for the nation might be desirable. Nothing ever came of General MacArthur’s proposal, but who knows what course events might have taken in the FarEast had the occupation forces been removed and Japan placed under United Nations protection. 1
    In the spring of 1950, rumors began to circulate in Tōkyō about a separate peace treaty for Japan with each of the Allied nations, which immediately polarized Japanese politics. In the controversy that developed, Prime Minister Yoshida and his Liberal Party (JiyÅ«tō) were prepared to sign a peace treaty with any of the nation’s former enemies willing to recognize Japan’s sovereignty. The Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō) protested loudly, wanting a multilateral agreement that would give Japan a single peace treaty with all the Allied nations, including the Soviet Union. The debate came to a head when Dr. Shigeru Nambara, president of Tōkyō University, dramatically declared that he stood for a “total peace treaty or none.” Yoshida is alleged to have retorted privately, “He’s crazy.” Publicly, the prime minister replied on May 3 that Dr. Nambara “was playing to the galleries.”
    While the controversy raged in Japan, the Soviet Union continued to obstruct every effort to reach a multilateral agreement. Suddenly, the United States decided to give Japan a separate peace treaty whether Russians participated or not. On May 18, 1950, the United States accordingly announced that Defense Secretary Louis A.Johnson and General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, planned to discuss with General MacArthur in Tōkyō the military implications of a peace treaty with Japan. On the following day, May 19, President Truman told the press that he hoped a Japanese peace conference could be held soon, and he said he had appointed John Foster Dulles to negotiate the peace treaty. About two weeks later, the Japanese government, in an unprecedented statement for a vanquished state, bluntly